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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
TANJA RYNHART, : Case No. 20040115-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d 
814 (opinion attached in Addendum A\ which reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress (ruling attached in Addendum B). Jurisdiction exists under UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did defendant forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy in her minivan and its 
contents when she left the vehicle wrecked and unlocked on another's property and failed to 
notify the property owner or police of the damage she had caused? 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). "The 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. James, 2000 UT 
80, Tf 8, 13 P.3d 576. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and its factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936-939 & n.4 (Utah 1994); State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 
Tf 8, 6 P.3d 1133. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, an enhanced second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), (4)(a) (West 2004), and 
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37a-5 (West 2004). Following a preliminary hearing on 29 May 2002, defendant was bound 
over for trial. R15; R72:15. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress drugs seized 
pursuant to a warrantless search of her purse, which she left inside her wrecked minivan on 
another's private property. R24-27. The same judge who conducted the preliminary hearing 
conducted the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. R72-73. Because the judge 
was familiar with the essentially undisputed evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, the 
2 
suppression hearing was abbreviated. R73. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, 
ruling that defendant had not "abandoned" her vehicle or its contents, but that the warrantless 
search was otherwise justified under the emergency aid doctrine. R44-48 (Add. B). 
Defendant successfully petitioned the court of appeals for interlocutory review. A 
majority of the court of appeals' panel reversed the trial court's ruling. See Rynhart, 2003 
UT App 410, \ 18 (Add. A). The majority concluded that the trial court's underlying findings 
were clearly erroneous and failed to support the trial court's determination that there was an 
emergency or that the emergency aid doctrine applied. See id. at 113 (citing Salt Lake City 
v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, If 12, 994 P.2d 1283). In a footnote, the majority addressed 
the State's alternative ground for affirmance—that defendant forfeited any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the minivan and its contents after leaving the vehicle wrecked and 
unlocked on another's property. See id. at % 9 n.3. The majority first opined that the State 
had not preserved the issue because it had not cross-appealed on the alternative ground, but 
then rejected the argument on its merits by affirming the trial court's conclusion that 
defendant retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents. See id. 
The dissent agreed that the emergency aid doctrine did not justify the warrantless 
search, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that "[defendant] maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the minivan and its contents when, following a single 
car accident, she left it, unsecured and parked on property not owned by [defendant]." See 
id. at Tf 20 (Thorne, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissent first noted that the State was 
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under "no duty" to cross appeal because an appellate court is "permitted to affirm the trial 
court's order—in this case the denial of the motion to suppress—on any grounds apparent 
from the record, even if the trial court addressed the ground [relied] upon in a subsidiary 
ruling." Id. at f^ 20 n. 1. Turning to the merits, the dissent criticized the majority's reliance 
on cases having "little or nothing to do with the issue of abandonment." See id. at fflf 21-23. 
The majority's flawed abandonment standard "fl[ew] in the face of widely accepted 
abandonment analysis for Fourth Amendment purposes" and failed to consider the totality 
of the circumstances supporting the State's alternative theory. See id. at fflf 20,24 n.4 & 35 
n.8. The dissent concluded that defendant forfeited any legitimate expectation of privacy in 
her vehicle and her purse left on its floor when she failed to take "normal precautions to 
maintain her privacy" and left the vehicle unlocked on another's private property for over 
five and one-half hours without notifying the property owner or police of the accident. See 
id. at fflf 24 & 31-36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the 
dissent concluded that the trial court had correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress, 
through not under the correct theory. See id. at f^ 39. 
The State timely petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
!On certiorari, this Court applies the same standard of review applied by the court 
of appeals, that is, it reviews the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 3, 985 P.2d 911; 
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 
(UtahApp. 1994); 
4 
About 8:30 a.m., on 6 January 2002, Officer Bumham of the Brigham City Police 
Department received a dispatch report of an abandoned or wrecked vehicle in a field. R72:2-
3. Arriving at the scene of what appeared to be an accident, Officer Burnham saw a minivan 
"out in the middle of a swamp." R72:3. The minivan had "traveled over the curb [of West 
Forest Street], down an embankment," and "through two fences" before coming to rest "out 
in the marsh." Id. It had snowed at approximately 3:00 a.m. that morning and the tire tracks 
of the van were snow covered. Officer Burnham surmised that the accident occurred at least 
five and one-half hours earlier, sometime prior to 3:00 a.m. R72:4. 
The officer walked down the embankment to the wrecked vehicle, but saw no one 
outside the minivan. R72:4-5. He opened the van's unlocked door and looked inside to see 
if he could determine the identify of the van's owner and/or driver and to determine "if 
anybody was in the vehicle at all." R72:4-5; R73:10. No one was inside, but the officer 
observed a briefcase on the front passenger seat and a purse on the floor. Id. He opened the 
purse and located defendant's driver's license, as well as $329 in cash and "a small bag that 
had a white powdery substance in it." Id. He observed a partially full bottle of vodka in the 
console area between the two front seats. Id. 
Officer Burnham tried unsuccessfully to reach defendant by telephone. R72:4-5,7-8. 
The owner of the field arrived at the scene a few minutes later; he wanted the minivan 
removed from his property so he could repair his damaged fences. R72:5-6; R73:10. At 
approximately 9:35 a.m., Officer Burnham arranged for the van to be towed off the property. 
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R72:6; R73:13. Before it was removed, Officer Burnham "look[ed] through the entire 
vehicle for any valuables," noted the purse and briefcase, but did not otherwise prepare a 
written inventory of the van's contents. R72:7-8; R73:l 1-13. Officer Burnham was at the 
scene for one and one-half hours or until approximately 10:00 a.m. R73:13. During that 
time, defendant did not return to her vehicle or otherwise contact the property owner or 
police. R72:4, 7-8. 
Approximately four hours later, around 2:00 p.m., the tow company contacted Officer 
Burnham and told him that defendant was trying to recover the minivan. R72:6. Officer 
Burnham met defendant at the wrecking yard and asked her about the baggie he had found 
in her purse. Defendant "kind of laughed and said [she had forgotten] about that" and 
claimed the cocaine belonged to a friend. R72:7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not objects. Consequently, whether a 
particular object is entitled to constitutional protection depends on its nature, its use, its 
location, and the reasonableness of a defendant's expectation that it would be free from 
warrantless governmental intrusion. The same object may be constitutionally protected in 
one location, but not protected in another. Similarly, an object may be constitutionally 
protected at one point in time, but not protected at another. Nevertheless, the inquiry for 
Fourth Amendment purposes is always whether—at the time of the search—the defendant 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place and object to be searched, which 
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expectation was objectively reasonable given the totality of the surrounding circumstances, 
including defendant's words, actions, and conduct. 
Here, defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in her van or purse at the 
time of the police search. Defendant left the scene of an accident without notifying the 
property owner or police as required by statute. She left her vehicle in a swampy marsh on 
another's property. She did not lock the vehicle's doors or otherwise secure her personal 
possessions. Because she did not safeguard the vehicle or its contents, she forfeited any 
reasonable expectation that either would be protected from invasion. Because any passer-by 
had open access to the vehicle and purse, defendant cannot complain that the police had 
equal access. In sum, the search of defendant's minivan and purse did not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT FORFEITED ANY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY WHEN SHE LEFT HER PURSE IN PLAIN VIEW IN HER 
UNLOCKED VEHICLE IN A MARSH AND FAILED TO NOTIFY THE 
PROPERTY OWNER OR POLICE OF THE DAMAGE SHE HAD 
CAUSED 
In Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, \ 9 n.3, the majority held that defendant did not 
"abandon" her expectation of privacy in her minivan and purse and, therefore, the Fourth 
Amendment applied. Concluding that no exception justified the warrantless search, the 
majority reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at ^ f 18. For 
the reasons discussed below, the decision is erroneous. 
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(A) "Abandonment" in the Fourth Amendment context is distinct from 
property law. 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not objects or places. See Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128,133-34 (1978); Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). As a result, 
the amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 2.1(a), at 377 (3rd ed. 1996) [hereafter LaFave], Instead, the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether a person's words, actions, and 
conduct demonstrate a subjective intent to keep her activities and/or possessions private and 
whether that subjective intent is objectively reasonable given the totality of the surrounding 
circumstances. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12. Consequently, "what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. "The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their 
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the 
public." California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). 
A person may have an expectation of privacy in an object or place, but forfeit that 
expectation through her words, actions, and conduct. Id. at 39-40 (refusing to recognize a 
privacy interest in trash left on the street). Prior to Rakas, courts commonly referred to this 
as "abandonment." See, e.g.9 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924). 
"Abandonment," however, is a term of art with a distinct meaning in property law, that is, 
"the relinquishing of a right or interest with the intention of never again claiming it." 
BlackJs Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Rakas made clear that such "arcane concepts of 
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property law" do not control Fourth Amendment analysis. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 105 (1980). 
"The distinction between abandonment in the property-law sense and abandonment 
in the constitutional sense is critical to a proper analysis of the issue." LaFave at 574 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
In the law of property, the question . . . is whether the owner has voluntarily, 
intentionally, and unconditionally relinquished his interest in the property so 
that another, having acquired possession, may successfully assert his superior 
interest In the law of search and seizure, however, the question is whether 
the defendant has, in discarding the property, relinquished his reasonable 
expectation of privacy so that its seizure and search is reasonable within the 
limits of the Fourth Amendment. . . . In essence, what is abandoned is not 
necessarily the defendant's property, but his reasonable expectation of privacy 
therein. 
Id. Consequently, "even an inadvertent leaving of effects in a public place, whether or not 
an abandonment in the true sense of the word, can amount to a loss of any justified 
expectation of privacy." LaFave at 575-76. Fourth Amendment privacy expectations will 
vary with the type of property involved as well as the location of the property at the time of 
the search. See LaFave at 579. See, e.g., Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06 (recognizing that 
even through Rawlings owned the drugs in question, he forfeited any legitimate expectation 
of privacy when he placed them in his companion's purse); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (noting that 
what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected"); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1154 (4th Cir. 
1980) ("What is a reasonable expectation of privacy is by definition related to time, place and 
9 
circumstance.5'), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981). 
(B) The Rynhart majority erroneously applied property law standards, rather 
than proper Fourth Amendment analysis. 
The State has never contested defendant's ownership of the minivan and purse. Nor 
has it contested the legitimacy of defendant's expectation of privacy in the van and purse at 
the time of the accident. The State challenges only the reasonableness of defendant's 
expectation of privacy at the time of the search. 
In the trial court and the court of appeals, the State contended that defendant forfeited 
any legitimate expectation of privacy in the van and purse when she left the purse in open 
view on the floor of the unlocked van in the middle of a marsh on another's property and did 
not notify the police or property owner of the damage she had caused as statutorily required. 
R44-46; Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, Tf 9 n.3. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (West 
2004) (imposing a duty on a driver who damages unattended property to locate and notify the 
property owner of the damage or to "attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle," 
a note with the driver's name and address) {Addendum C). 
The trial court agreed with the State as to what factually occurred, but nevertheless 
concluded that "the State had failed to carry its burden to show abandonment." R46 (Add. B). 
Quoting State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736 (Utah App. 1991), rev 'd on other grounds, 850 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the trial court concluded that the evidence was not "clear, unequivocal 
and decisive" that defendant intended to "abandon" the vehicle when she left it in the field. 
R46. The court noted that while there was evidence of the path and location of the van (the 
10 
van went over the street curb, down an embankment, and came to rest in a swampy marsh 
in the middle of a field), but not whether it was drivable. If drivable, the trial court believed 
the officer may have been justified in viewing the van as "abandoned." Id. But if damaged, 
the court opined that defendant may not have had time to arrange for its retrieval given the 
early hour of the accident and winter conditions. Id. After concluding that the van was not 
"abandoned," the trial court denied the motion to suppress on other grounds. R46-47. 
Defendant sought and was granted interlocutory review of the denial. In the court of 
appeals, the State argued the merits of the trial court's ruling, but additionally argued that the 
denial could be sustained on the alternative ground that defendant lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the van and purse at the time of the search. See Brief of Appellee, 
No. 20020760-CA, at 18-21. A majority of the court of appeals' panel initially refused to 
consider the merits of the State's alternative argument on procedural grounds, but then 
considered and rejected its merits.2 See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, f 9 n.3. 
2The majority initially concluded that the State's failure to cross-appeal on the 
"abandonment" theory precluded review of its merits. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, f^ 
9 n.3. The dissent correctly pointed out that the State had no obligation to cross-appeal 
when it had won below, albeit on a different theory. The dissent recognized that the 
interlocutory ruling—the pretrial denial of defendant's motion to suppress—could be 
affirmed on any ground apparent from the record See id. at \ 20 n. 1 (Thorne, J. 
dissenting) (citing State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996)). Accord Bailey v. 
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ffif 10 & 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (reaffirming the "well-settled" rule that an 
appellate court may affirm on any ground legally and factually sustainable on the record). 
But see State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ffif 9-11, 76 P.3d 1159 (refusing to remand for 
additional findings to support a new theory raised by the State post-verdict). Here, the 
factual findings necessary to support the alternative theory were fully found by the trial 
court: defendant left her wrecked van on another's property for over five and one-half 
hours, without securing the vehicle or its contents and without notifying the property 
11 
The Rynhart majority cited State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, and 
numerous decisions from other jurisdictions for the proposition "that Rynhart, as a vehicle 
occupant, may have possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of her 
vehicle." See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, [^ 9 n.3. The State does not contend otherwise. 
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (recognizing that passengers as well 
as drivers have a reduced expectation of privacy in personal possessions transported in 
vehicles). 
But as recognized by the dissent, the issue here is whether "Rynhart maintained a 
legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in either the van or the purse" when she left 
them unsecured on another's property for over five and one-half hours following the 
accident. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ^ 23 (dissent) (emphasis added). Stated 
differently, did defendant forfeit a reasonable expectation that the van and purse would be 
protected from intrusion—whether by a passer-by or the police—when she failed to take 
normal steps to secure the van and its contents before leaving the vehicle on another's 
property for over five and one-half hours? 
The Rynhart majority never focused on this question. Instead, it held that because 
Rynhart possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when she occupied the vehicle, that 
owner or police of the damage she caused. R44-46. The trial court disagreed only on the 
legal sufficiency of these facts to establish "abandonment." Id. On appeal, the State 
properly re-raised its trial argument that the facts were sufficient to establish defendant's 
forfeiture of a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Bailey, 2002 UT 58, \ 10; South, 
924 P.2d at 356. Ultimately, the court of appeals reached the merits. See Rynhart, 2003 
UT App 410, If 9 n.3 & ffi[ 24-39. 
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expectation necessarily continued until the State established that she "voluntarily 
relinquished" it. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, If 9 n.3. Citing Bissegger, 2003 UT App 
256, the majority concluded that there was "no support whatsoever that Rynhart abandoned 
her expectation of privacy" in her purse and that the State had failed to challenge the trial 
court's "findings on abandonment" when it did not cross-appeal. SeeRynharty id. (emphasis 
in original). See also discussion, n.2, supra. 
Bissegger's analytical foundation is Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, which also formed the 
framework for the trial court's decision. See Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256,113. See also 
R45-46. In Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ^ 15, the court of appeals concluded that 
Bissegger, a vehicle passenger, did not relinquish an expectation of privacy in her lip-balm 
container when she left it inside a vehicle when the police ordered her to exit. The court of 
appeals adopted the "abandonment" standard approved in dicta in Rowe: 
Determining whether abandonment occurred is 'primarily a factual question 
of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy.' Rowe, 
806 P.2d at 736. Thus, the abandonment determination involves two inquiries: 
(1) whether the individual relinquished a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the item; and (2) whether the relinquishment was voluntary. See id. 'The 
burden of proving abandonment falls on the state,. . . and must be shown by 
clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.' Id. 
Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, Tj 14. As the Rynhart dissent recognized, the Bissegger-Rowe 
standard conflicts with established Fourth Amendment analysis.3 See Rynhart, 2003 UT 
3Rowe was overturned by this Court on other grounds, rendering its discussion of 
expectation of privacy non-controlling. In Bissegger, the court of appeals formally 
adopted the Rowe dicta. This Court has not previously addressed the issue. 
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App410,f24n.4. 
Though the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with property concepts, 
see discussion, supra, the Bissegger-Rowe standard impermissibly incorporates property 
terms and standards. "Abandonment" is used in its property sense, that is, to voluntarily 
relinquish ownership. See Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ^ 14; Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. 
Similarly, the Bissegger-Rowe requirement that relinquishment be proven by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence" is a civil standard imposed to determine when lawful 
ownership has been permanently forsaken. See Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98-
99 (Utah App. 1988); Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 
1952) (cited in Friedman v. United States\ 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 382 
U.S. 946 (1965), which case was cited in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 730). Moreover, a "clear and 
unequivocal" standard of proof conflicts with the preponderance of the evidence standard 
normally applied to suppression issues. See, e.g.y Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 
(1986) (holding that the prosecution has no greater burden than a preponderance to establish 
a waiver of "Miranda" rights); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) 
(recognizing that "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no 
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, *| 56,63 P.3d 650 (imposing a preponderance standard in determining the voluntariness 
of a consent to search); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (imposing a 
preponderance standard in determining if common authority exists to support a consent to 
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search and recognizing that in any suppression hearing, there is "no greater burden than proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence"); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1985) 
(recognizing that in any suppression hearing, the preponderance standard applies).4 
Nevertheless, the trial court and the Rynhart majority fully embraced the Bissegger-
Rowe standard. See R45-46; Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410 f 9 n.3. The standard led both 
courts to erroneously conclude that defendant necessarily retained her expectation of privacy 
in her van and purse unless the State established clearly and unequivocally that she 
intentionally and voluntarily relinquished any interest she had in her vehicle and purse when 
she left the accident scene. As will be discussed below, the Fourth Amendment does not 
require such proof. 
(C) The Rynhart majority erroneously focused on defendant's future intent, 
rather than the objective reasonableness of her actions and conduct at the 
time of the search. 
Whether an expectation of privacy exists is a "question of intent." SeeLaFave at 550. 
Here, the Rynhart majority concluded that there was "no support whatsoever that Rynhart 
abandoned her expectation of privacy in her purse . . . or wallet." Rynhart, 2003 UT App 
410,19 n.3. The majority appears to have reached this conclusion because no evidence was 
presented of defendant's actual subjective intent. The Fourth Amendment, however, does 
4Two of the cases cited in Rowe in support of a "clear and unequivocal" standard 
pre-date Rakas. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736 (citing Friedman, 347 F.2d 697 and United 
States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1975)). These cases have been modified post-
Rakas. See n.5, infra. The third case cited, O'Shaughnessey v. State, 420 So.2d 377 
(Fla. App. 1982), was reaffirmed in State v. K.W., 832 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. App. 2002). 
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not require the State to present evidence of a defendant's internal thoughts—indeed, it would 
rarely be possible to do so. Instead, "[t]he test is an objective one, and intent may be 
inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." United States v. Thomas, 
864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (cited with approval in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736). 
The majority's confusion undoubtedly arises from Rowe, as adopted in Bissegger. 
Rowe initially cited Thomas and other authority for the correct proposition that the "question 
of intent" is an objective determination. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. In its next paragraph, 
however, Rowe cited Narian v. State, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (Md. App. 1989), cert 
denied, 562 A.2d 718 (Md. 1989), for the contradictory proposition that intent is judged from 
the "vantage point of the defendant and not the police." See id. Even the Maryland court 
recognized that their discussion of intent was only dicta. SeeNarian, 556 A.2d at 1161 n.4. 
See also 20 Maryland Law Encyclopedia, Searches and Seizures § 14 (2004) (recognizing 
that Maryland law dictates that even though intent is subjective, it "is determined from the 
objective facts at hand"). The other authority cited in Rowe has also been modified in light 
of Rakas" s clear pronouncement that only a subj ective intent which is obj ectively reasonable 
can invoke constitutional protection.5 See discussion, supra. 
5Rowe cited Friedman mdBoswell. See n.4, supra. Fost-Rakas, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that Boswell was wrong in concluding that a 
defendant's subjective intent controlled. See Godfrey v. United States, 408 A.2d 1244, 
1246-47 & n.l (D.C. Cir. 1979). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
recognized: "Whether an abandonment has occurred is determined on the basis of the 
objective facts available to the investigating officers, not on the basis of the owner's 
subjective intent." United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1061(1998). 
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The Rynhart dissent correctly recognized that a defendant's subjective intent is only 
a factor to be considered in determining the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, many 
courts presume that a defendant may harbor a subjective hope that her property, though left 
in a public place, will be free from intrusion. See, e.g., Ramapuram, 632 F.2d at 1155 
(presuming that the defendant had a subjective expectation that dynamite hidden in the truck 
of a "junker" would not be discovered, but holding that such a belief was objectively 
unreasonable where the unlocked vehicle was located in an open field). Moreover, whether 
a defendant harbors an intent to reclaim the property in the future is not controlling, though 
this subjective intent, if reasonable, may be considered. See United States v. Barlow, 17 
F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir.) (recognizing that a property owner need not intend to permanently 
relinquish ownership or possession to forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy; she only 
needs to leave an item unsecured in a public place), cert denied, 513 U.S. 850 (1994); 
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that if the facts known 
at the time of the search obj ectively establish no legitimate privacy expectation, a defendant's 
subsequent conduct cannot "revoke the abandonment nunc pro tunc"). 
Ultimately, the test is whether the external manifestations of defendant's intent, that 
is, her voluntary words, actions, or conduct, would lead a reasonable person in the searching 
officer's position to believe that the defendant had forfeited any legitimate privacy interest 
in the object or place to be searched. See United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449,456 (7th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 128 (2003); Tugwell, 125 F.3d at 602; United States v. Perkins, 871 
17 
F. Supp. 801, 803 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (all recognizing that whether an expectation of privacy 
exists must be judged by what a reasonable person in the officer's position would have 
believed based on the facts known at the time of the search). Such a standard is no more that 
the "other side of the coin" of Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy analysis. See 
People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450,259 Cal.Rptr. 290 (Cal. App. 1989) (recognizing 
that "standing" and "abandonment" are "two sides of the same coin;" whereas a defendant 
must establish an expectation of privacy, the prosecution must establish the forfeiture of that 
expectation) (cited with approval in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736). 
As will be discussed below, here, the officer's presumption that he, like any other 
passer-by, could enter the vehicle and look inside the purse was reasonable based on the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the search. 
(D) Under proper analysis, the evidence establishes that defendant forfeited 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in her van and purse when she left it 
unlocked and in open view on another ys propertyfor over five and one-half 
hours. 
Under proper Fourth Amendment analysis, the issue to be resolved is whether, 
following the accident, defendant's actions and conduct forfeited any reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the van and purse. See discussion, supra. 
The facts are undisputed. See Statement of Facts & Add. B (Ruling). Defendant 
owned the minivan and purse. At the time of the accident, she had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy that both would be free from warrantless search. 
The single-car accident was serious: defendant drove off the road, over a curb, down 
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an embankment and through two field fences, landing in a swampy marsh in the middle of 
a privately-owned field. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (Add C), she was obligated 
to locate and notify the property owner of the damage she had caused or "attach securely in 
a conspicuous place on the vehicle," a note with her name and address. She did neither. 
Instead, she left a briefcase on the front seat, her purse on the van's floor, and a partially 
consumed vodka bottle in the console area between the two front seats. She did not lock the 
doors to the vehicle or otherwise attempt to secure it. She left the accident scene. For five 
and one-half hours, until the officer arrived, any passer-by could fully access the interior of 
the vehicle, the purse, and the briefcase. See Statement of Facts at 4-5. See also United 
States v. Austin, 66F .3d 1115, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that a defendant must 
take "normal precautions" to safeguard her privacy, or assume the risk that intrusion, 
including governmental intrusion, may occur), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996); United 
States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1571 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a legitimate 
expectation of privacy may not depend "entirely upon fate and the absence of inquisitive (and 
acquisitive) passers-by"), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1102 (1992). 
When the officer arrived, he searched the vehicle, but only to extent that any passer-by 
could have—the officer simply opened the vehicle's unlocked door and looked inside the 
purse and briefcase which were in plain view. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (holding that 
property readily accessible to "animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of 
the public," is not protected from governmental search). The property owner arrived and 
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wanted the van removed from his property so he could repair the damage to his fences. The 
vehicle was towed. Four and one-half hours after it had been towed, some eleven hours after 
the accident occurred, defendant attempted to retrieve her property from the wrecking 
company. See Statement of Facts at 5-6. 
Given the totality of the circumstances, defendant forfeited any reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the van and purse when she left the accident scene without securing her 
property and without providing notification as statutorily required. Accord Barlow, 17 F.3d 
at 88-90 (holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in his vehicle, when he 
left it unlocked with the key in the ignition on a public street at night); Oswald, 783 F.2d at 
665-67 (holding that the defendant forfeited a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
suitcase when he left it in his burning car on the side of the road); State v. Brunson, 111 P.2d 
938, 389 (Kan. App. 1989) (holding that the defendant forfeited any reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his vehicle when he left it on a golf course, with its lights on, and the keys in 
the ignition); State v. Anderson, 548 N.W.2d 40, 42 (S.D. 1996) (holding that defendant 
forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy when, following an accident, he left his 
vehicle with the doors unlocked and the keys in the ignition) 
The trial court accepted these facts, but came to a different conclusion as to their 
significance. Based on Rowe, the trial court opined that it needed to know if the van was 
drivable. If it was, the court believed it would be reasonable to assume that it was 
"abandoned"; if not, the court presumed that defendant did not have enough time to arrange 
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for its recovery. R46. It was these "findings" that the court of appeals viewed as 
unchallenged and, therefore, binding on the State on appeal. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 
410, \ 9 n.3. The trial court's statements, however, were not factual; they simply reflected 
the judge's opinion of the sufficiency of the facts. Moreover, in this case, the mobility of the 
vehicle is irrelevant to the privacy issue. Whatever the mobility of the minivan, it was in the 
middle of a marsh. Moreover, defendant failed to lock the vehicle or otherwise protect its 
contents when she left it, knowing that any passer-by, including the police, might investigate 
the obvious accident. See Houghton, 562 U.S. at 303 (recognizing that when a vehicle is in 
an accident, it is reasonable to assume that its contents may be exposed to public scrutiny); 
Cormney v. Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. App. 1996) (recognizing that a 
subjective expectation of privacy necessarily yields to the public safety interest of police 
investigating traffic accidents); Muegel v. State, 272 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ind. 1971) 
(recognizing that when an unlocked vehicle is left unattended on the road, it is reasonable 
for an officer to enter it to search for the vehicle's registration); Brunson, 111 P.2d at 395 
(recognizing that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen the possibility of a police 
search when he left his vehicle unlocked on a golf course); State v. Lemacks, 268 S.E.2d 285 
(S.C. 1980) (recognizing that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the police 
would investigate and possibly tow his unlocked vehicle when it was parked in a hazardous 
manner). 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant had no reasonable expectation 
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of privacy in her vehicle or purse at the time Officer Burnham searched them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and affirm 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The matter should then be 
remanded to the district court to proceed to trial. 
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|^ 1 Tanja Rynhart appeals from a trial court order 
denying her motion to suppress evidence seized 
during a warrantless search of her vehicle. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 On the morning of January 6, 2002, Officer 
Robert Burnham of the Brigham City Police 
Department received a dispatch call requesting 
investigation of an abandoned or wrecked vehicle. 
Burnham responded to the call at approximately 
8:30 a.m. Upon arriving at the location of the 
vehicle, Burnham discovered that the vehicle had 
"traveled over the curb, down an embankment, 
[and] through two fences," before coming to rest in 
a "marsh" or "swamp." Burnham also discovered 
that the tire tracks leading to the vehicle were 
covered with snow. Because Burnham recalled that 
"[i]t had snowed as recently as 3:00" a.m., he 
determined that the accident had occurred at some 
point prior to that time. 
T[ 3 As Burnham approached the vehicle, he saw 
that it had a license plate, but he did not attempt to 
identify the owner of the vehicle by using the license 
plate number. Burnham entered the unlocked 
vehicle and discovered that there was no one inside. 
At the May 29, 2002 preliminary hearing, Burnham 
testified that his purpose for entering the vehicle was 
to "[t]ry to find out the identity of the owner, the 
driver, and if anybody was in the vehicle at all." 
However, at the July 22, 2002 hearing *816 on the 
motion to suppress, Burnham admitted that he 
performed a "very thorough search" of the vehicle, 
and testified that he "opened all the doors" and 
"looked under the seats." He testified that there 
were "quite a number of items in the vehicle," but 
admitted that he did not inventory all of the 
vehicle's contents. Burnham indicated that he was 
"primarily concerned with" finding and retrieving 
any "jewelry," "money," or "valuables" that may 
have been left in the vehicle. 
II 4 In his search of the vehicle, Burnham found a 
partially full bottle of vodka in the console between 
the two front seats, a briefcase on the front 
passenger seat, and a purse on the floor near the 
front passenger seat. He searched through the purse 
and the briefcase to determine their contents. Inside 
the purse, Burnham found a wallet, which he also 
searched. In his search of the purse and the wallet, 
Burnham found Rynhart's driver license, $329 in 
cash, several gift certificates, a small plastic bag 
containing a "white powdery substance," and "a 
mirror with some powder on it." 
K 5 After Burnham completed his investigation, he 
had the vehicle towed to a wrecking yard for "safe 
keeping," but did not officially impound the vehicle. 
[FN1] He retained the briefcase, the purse, and the 
items he found in the purse. At some point after he 
had "cleared from the scene" of the accident, 
Burnham attempted to contact Rynhart by phone, 
but was unsuccessful. Later that afternoon, 
someone from the wrecking yard contacted Burnham 
by phone to notify him that Rynhart was attempting 
to retrieve her vehicle. Burnham went to the 
wrecking yard and met with Rynhart. At that time, 
Burnham asked Rynhart about the small plastic bag 
containing white powder that he had found in 
Rynhart's purse. Rynhart admitted to Burnham that 
the small plastic bag contained cocaine, but told him 
that it belonged to a friend. 
FNL Burnham neither attempted to obtain a 
warrant nor conduct an inventory search. 
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f 6 On March 27, 2002, Rynhart was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet 
of a public structure, a second degree felony, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. At the conclusion of the May 29, 
2002 preliminary hearing, the trial court ruled that 
there were "reasonable grounds to believe that 
[Rynhart] committed the offense [s]M and, 
accordingly, "required] that [Rynhart] be held to 
answer on the charges." Rynhart pleaded not guilty 
to both charges. 
H 7 Thereafter, Rynhart filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized during Burnham's warrantless 
search of her vehicle. In its ruling on Rynhart's 
motion, the trial court determined that Rynhart had 
not abandoned her expectation of privacy in her 
vehicle. In support of this determination, the trial 
court made the following findings, which are not 
challenged on appeal: 
The officer inspected the vehicle at 8:30 in the 
morning and determined that it had been in the 
marsh since at least 3:00 ... that morning. The 
owner or driver would not have had time to make 
arrangements to retrieve the vehicle if it was 
damaged. The State failed to present any evidence 
of the state of the vehicle. If the vehicle could be 
driven, then the officer may have been more 
justified in believing that it had been abandoned. 
Although there clearly had been an accident, it 
appears that no other vehicles were involved. The 
apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the 
single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to 
belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon 
the vehicle. 
However, the trial court also determined that 
Burnham's warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle 
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. 
[FN2] See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT 
App 12,H 12, 994 P.2d 1283. In support of this 
determination the trial court entered the following 
findings: 
FN2. Although the trial court refers to this 
doctrine as "the community caretaker function" in 
its ruling, it applies the elements of the emergency 
aid doctrine set forth in Salt Lake City v. 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,11 12, 994 P.2d 1283, 
to determine whether Burnham's warrantless 
search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified. 
The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold 
January night. The absence of the driver made it 
imperative that the officer identify the driver so 
that he or she could *817 be found. The driver 
could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. 
The officer acted appropriately in attempting to 
determine who was [sic] the driver. Although 
[Rynhart] makes a good point that the owner of 
the vehicle could be ascertained by using the 
license plate number, the owner and the driver are 
not necessarily the same person, and the officer 
had a duty to ascertain the facts in order to 
preserve life in the event the driver had wandered 
off and was lost. 
Based upon its conclusion that the emergency aid 
doctrine was applicable, the trial court denied 
Rynhart's motion to suppress in an order dated 
September 3, 2002. 
K 8 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart petitioned this 
court, pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, to permit her appeal from the 
trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion 
to suppress. On November 5, 2002, we granted that 
petition and Rynhart's appeal ensued. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] \ 9 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial 
court erred in denying Rynhart's motion to suppress 
evidence. [FN3] The trial *818 court denied the 
motion based upon its determination that the 
warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified 
under the emergency aid doctrine. See Salt Lake 
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,H 12, 994 P.2d 
1283. 
FN3. Although this is the sole issue raised by 
Rynhart, the State suggests that we should, without 
the benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the trial 
court's ruling that Rynhart had not abandoned her 
expectation of privacy in her vehicle. Not only 
does the record offer scant support for that 
proposition, it offers no support whatsoever that 
Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in 
her purse and the contents thereof, or her wallet 
and the contents thereof. In State v. Bissegger, 
2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, we cited 
numerous cases addressing the issue of a motor 
vehicle occupant's expectation of privacy in 
personal belongings left in the vehicle. 
See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 
1396 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that a car passenger 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of 
his companion's car); People v. Manke, 181 
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Ill.App.3d 374, 130 111.Dec. 192, 537 N.E.2d 13, 
15 (1989) (concluding that a car passenger whose 
closed brown paper bag was found in car's trunk, 
and was searched by police, had standing to 
challenge search); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 
Va.App. 313, 437 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1993) 
(holding that a car passenger had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his closed plastic 
shopping bag found on the floor of the car). 
Other jurisdictions have also held that car 
passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in their coats or jackets found in cars. See People 
v. Armendarez, 188 Mich.App. 61, 468 N.W.2d 
893, 900 (1991) (finding that car passenger had 
"standing to object to the search of his personal 
effects in the car, namely, his coat," where his coat 
was found on front seat of vehicle); State v. 
McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 P.2d 111, 112-13 
(1993) (holding that car passenger had legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled 
on the back seat of car). 
Finally, other jurisdictions have found that car 
passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in their purses left in cars. See United States v. 
Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.1993) 
(holding that the owner of a shoulder bag, located 
on the front seat of his girlfriend's car, had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its 
contents); United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 
764 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that car passenger who 
left her purse in her boyfriend's car "had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 
her purse. Indeed, a purse is a type of container in 
which a person possesses the highest expectations 
of privacy."); State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 
1235-37 (IndCt.App.1999) (holding that car 
passenger whose purse was found on floor behind 
driver's seat and searched had standing because "a 
purse is clearly a container in which a person has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy"). 
Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256 at ffl 9-11, 76 P.3d 
178. 
In his dissent, our colleague admits that these cases 
clearly support the proposition that vehicle 
occupants may possess a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their personal belongings left in a 
vehicle. However, he asserts that we have 
"mistakenly" focused our attention on these cases 
and the proposition they stand for in reaching our 
conclusion that Rynhart did not abandon her 
expectation of privacy in her vehicle or its 
contents. He misapprehends our reliance upon 
these cases and the proposition they stand for. We 
do not rely upon these cases as the sole support for 
our ultimate conclusion on abandonment; rather, 
we rely upon these cases for the proposition that 
our colleague admits they stand for~that Rynhart, 
as a vehicle occupant, may have possessed a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of 
her vehicle. 
We then determine that (1) Rynhart clearly had "a 
subjective expectation of privacy" not just in her 
vehicle, but also in its contents; and (2) as the trial 
court's unchallenged findings on abandonment 
establish, that this "expectation was objectively 
reasonable."' Id. at If 7 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Accordingly, Rynhart did have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy both in her 
vehicle and in its contents. See id. 
Finally, again based upon the trial court's 
unchallenged findings on abandonment, we 
conclude that Rynhart never "voluntarily 
relinquished] a reasonable expectation of privacy" 
and, accordingly, that she did not abandon her 
expectation of privacy in her vehicle or in its 
contents. Id. at Tf 14 (quotations and citation 
omitted). In an era when our citizens' expectations 
of privacy are not only being eroded, but 
affirmatively attacked, we, too, are puzzled by the 
herculean effort of our esteemed colleague to 
obtain a result that not only is unsupported by the 
authorities he relies upon, unsupported by the 
facts, and contrary to the express ruling of the trial 
court, but also further erodes what is left of 
legitimate expectations of privacy. 
The factual findings underlying a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence are reviewed under the deferential 
clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts. 
State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
[2] K 10 Rynhart argues that the trial court erred in 
denying her motion to suppress evidence. The trial 
court denied the motion based upon its 
determination that the warrantless search of 
Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency 
aid doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 
UT App 12,H 12, 994 P.2d 1283. 
[3][4] [5] [6] 1f 11 "The Fourth Amendment prohibits 
all unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken 
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992) (citation omitted). "The burden of 
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establishing the existence of one of the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement is on the prosecution." 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); 
see State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 
1995). "One such exception to the warrant 
requirement recognized by both the United States 
Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts is 
exigent circumstances. The emergency aid doctrine, 
sometimes referred to as the medical emergency 
doctrine, is a variant of the exigent circumstances 
doctrine." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at ffi[ 9-10, 
994 P.2d 1283 (citations omitted). 
[7] [8] K 12 In Davidson, we explained that 
"[tjhe [emergency aid doctrine] will support a 
warrantless search of a person or personal effects 
when [a] person is found in an unconscious or 
semiconscious condition and the purpose of the 
search is to discover evidence of identification and 
other information that might enhance the prospect 
of administering appropriate medical assistance, 
and the rationale is that the need to protect life or 
avoid serious injury to another is paramount to the 
rights of privacy...." Several courts have also 
applied the emergency aid doctrine when a person 
is missing and feared to be injured or dead. 
Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) 
(quoting Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness 
of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under 
Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant 
Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th 52, § 2[a] (1993)). We 
adopted the emergency aid doctrine in Davidson, see 
id. at % 13, and provided the following test for its 
application: 
[A] warrantless search is lawful under the 
emergency aid doctrine if the following 
requirements are met: 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to 
believe that an emergency exists and believe there 
is an immediate need for their assistance for the 
protection of life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent 
to arrest and seize evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the 
emergency with the area or place to be searched. 
That is, there must be a connection with the area 
to be searched and the emergency. 
Id. at If 12 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Under this test, "[w]hether an emergency exists is 
fact intensive and the [S]tate has the *819 burden to 
prove that the exigencies of the situation make the 
course imperative." Id. at f^ 10 (quotations and 
citation omitted). "This court has observed that 
application of the emergency aid doctrine should be 
strictly circumscribed ... because of the significant 
departure [it] takes from Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence by requiring neither a warrant nor 
probable cause as prerequisites to a search." State 
v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219,f 17, 51 P.3d 55 
(quotations and citations omitted), cert, denied, 59 
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
U 13 To satisfy the first prong of the emergency aid 
doctrine, the State must show that Burnham had "an 
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency exist[ed]M and that he believed there was 
"an immediate need for [his] assistance for the 
protection of life." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 a t f 
12, 994 P.2d 1283 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Our review of the record and the trial court's ruling 
reveals that several of the trial court's findings 
relating to the first prong are clearly erroneous. 
K 14 The trial court determined that the first prong 
was satisfied based upon several findings. The trial 
court's findings that "[t]he accident occurred around 
3:00 a.m. on a cold January night," and that the 
driver was "absen[t]" are supported by evidence in 
the record. Although these findings certainly weigh 
in favor of satisfying the first prong, in this case 
they are not sufficient, without more, to satisfy the 
first prong. The trial court's other findings that 
"[t]he driver could have been in distress and lost or 
disoriented" and that "the officer had a duty ... to 
preserve life in the event the driver had wandered 
off and was lost" are speculative and unsupported by 
evidence in the record. There is no evidence in the 
record indicating that facts gathered by Burnham at 
the scene of the accident were objectively indicative 
of injury to possible victims of the accident which 
would require him to "preserve life," or of any 
passengers of the vehicle being "lost," 
"disoriented," or "in distress." [FN4] Accordingly, 
we conclude that these unsupported findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
FN4. Indeed, the accident occurred on a major 
street within 1000 feet of a public structure. 
f 15 Because the aforesaid findings are clearly 
erroneous, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
determining that the first prong of the emergency aid 
doctrine was satisfied. Consequently, the trial court 
erred in concluding that the emergency aid doctrine 
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was applicable in this case. 
[9] [10] ^ 16 Moreover, when "strictly 
circumscribed," the emergency aid doctrine, as a 
whole, does not apply to the facts of this case. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219 at If 17, 51 P.3d 55 
(quotations and citations omitted). First, because 
Burnham did not find anyone in the vehicle in an 
"unconscious or semiconscious condition," the 
doctrine would be applicable only if "a person [was] 
missing and feared to be injured or dead." 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at \ 10, 994 P.2d 1283 
(quotations and citations omitted). In that situation, 
"there must be some reliable and specific indication 
of the probability that a person is suffering from a 
serious physical injury before application of the 
[emergency aid] doctrine is justified." Comer, 2002 
UT App 219 at \ 20, 51 P.3d 55. There is no 
evidence in the record indicating that Burnham ever 
observed anything at the scene of the accident that 
was a "reliable and specific indication of the 
probability that a person [was] suffering from a 
serious physical injury." Id. Without these 
indications, not only was Burnham not justified in 
searching the purse or wallet under the emergency 
aid doctrine, he had no reason to believe that 
anything that may be found in the purse or wallet 
would provide these indications, or that the owner 
of the purse or wallet was even in the vehicle when 
it left the roadway. Second, under the rationale of 
the emergency aid doctrine, a warrantless search is 
allowed if "the purpose of the search is to discover 
evidence of identification and other information that 
might enhance the prospect of administering 
appropriate medical assistance, ... protecting] life[,] 
or avoid [ing] serious injury to another." Davidson, 
2000 UT App 12 at \ 10, 994 P.2d 1283 (quotations 
and citation omitted). Although Burnham did 
discover Rynhart's driver license during his 
warrantless search of her purse and wallet, there is 
no evidence in the record indicating *820 that he 
searched these items for this purpose. Other than 
his phone calls to Rynhart, there is no evidence in 
the record suggesting that he took any action after 
completing his search of these items that could be 
construed as an attempt to provide "appropriate 
medical assistance, ... protect life[,] or avoid serious 
injury to another." Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). Consequently, the trial court's application 
of the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, to the 
facts of this case was improper. 
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the trial court erred in determining that the 
emergency aid doctrine was applicable in this case. 
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
denying Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence 
seized during the warrantless search of her vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Tf 18 We conclude that several of the trial court's 
findings relating to the first prong of the emergency 
aid doctrine are clearly erroneous. Because these 
findings are clearly erroneous, we conclude that the 
trial court erred in determining that the first prong 
was satisfied and that the emergency aid doctrine 
was applicable in this case. Moreover, we conclude 
that the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in denying 
Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence seized during 
the warrantless search of her vehicle. 
H 19 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Tudge. 
THORNE, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
% 20 I concur with the majority's conclusion that 
the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under 
the emergency aid doctrine. However, we part 
ways when the majority concludes that Rynhart 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the van and its contents when, following a single car 
accident, she left it, unsecured and parked on 
property not owned by Rynhart. [FN1] My reasons 
for dissenting are threefold: (1) The majority, in 
summarily deciding that Rynhart did not abandon 
her expectation of privacy, relies on a series of 
cases that have little or nothing to do with the issue 
of abandonment; (2) the abandonment standard 
relied upon by the majority is actually a standard 
applicable to property law and it flies in the face of 
widely accepted abandonment analysis for Fourth 
Amendment purposes; and (3) even under the 
existing Utah standard, Rynhart abandoned her 
subjective expectation of privacy. 
FN1. The majority points out the fact that the 
State failed to file a cross appeal on the issue of 
abandonment. However, the State was under no 
duty to do so. We are permitted to affirm the trial 
court's order-in this case the denial of the motion 
to suppress-on any grounds apparent from the 
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record, even if the trial court addressed the ground 
we rely upon in a subsidiary ruling. See State v. 
South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996). Thus, if 
we are able to conclude from the record before us 
that Rynhart abandoned her reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the van, we can affirm the trial 
court's denial of Rynhart's motion to suppress on 
these grounds. See id. at 357. 
f 21 The majority, in drawing its conclusion, relies 
on a series of cases found in State v. Bissegger, 
2003 UT App 256,UH 13-15, 76 P.3d 178. However, 
not only did the Bissegger court cite these cases for 
a different proposition altogether, see id. at ffi[ 9-11, 
none of the cited cases addresses the abandonment 
of a legitimate expectation of privacy. See United 
States v. Buchner, 1 F.3d 1149, 1154-55 (5th 
Cir.1993) (addressing the scope of third party 
consent and probable cause to search); United 
States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir.1993) 
(addressing the scope and effect of third party 
consent to search); United States v. Salazar, 805 
F.2d 1394, 1396-98 (9th Cir.1986) (addressing a car 
passenger's standing to object to a search and the 
scope of the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement), overruled by 
implication by United States v. Lopez-Angulo, 1992 
LEXIS 26380, *2 (9th Cir. October 8, 1992); State 
v. Manke,% 181 Dl.App.3d 374, 130 Ill.Dec. 192, 
537 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1989) (addressing a passenger's 
standing to object to an automobile search, as well 
as the voluntariness of the driver's consent to a 
search); State v. Friedel, *821 714 N.E.2d 1231, 
1240 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (addressing the scope and 
effect of a car owner's consent to search an 
automobile on a passenger's property contained 
within the car); [FN2] State v. Armendarez, 188 
Mich.App. 61, 468 N.W.2d 893, 900-01 (1991) 
(examining a passenger's standing to object to a 
search of his personal belongings found in the car 
and concluding that the passenger's belongings were 
subject to search pursuant to the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement); State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 
P.2d 111, 113-14 (1993) (addressing the scope of 
the automobile exception and its applicability to 
containers and other objects found within the car to 
be searched); Arnold v. Virginia, 17 Va.App. 313, 
437 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1993) (addressing a person's 
standing to object to searches of their own property, 
but disposing of the argument under the plain view 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement). 
FN2. State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231 
(Ind.Ct.App.1999), briefly mentions, then 
summarily disposes of, the doctrine of 
abandonment, without venturing into any 
substantive analysis of the issue, presumably due to 
its inapplicability in the case. See id. at 1241. 
U 22 In relying on these cases, the majority 
mistakenly focuses its attention on the existence of a 
passenger's legitimate expectation of privacy in 
personal belongings located in a vehicle. From the 
aforementioned cases, clearly cited in Bissegger, 
there is no question that passengers in automobiles 
may possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
their own belongings located in a vehicle. See also 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 
S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) 
("Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a 
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to 
property that they transport in cars, which 'trave[l] 
public thoroughfares.' ") (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
H 23 However, these cases do not support the 
conclusion that Rynhart maintained a legitimate or 
reasonable expectation of privacy in either the van 
or the purse. [FN3] 
FN3. I am also puzzled by the majority's focus on 
the purse. While, admittedly, the critical evidence 
was discovered in the purse, had this situation 
involved only the purse, and not the van, there is 
little question that the officer's conduct would be 
considered eminently reasonable. The officer 
would have reasonably concluded that the purse, or 
at least the owner's reasonable expectation of 
privacy, had been abandoned. Thus, the critical 
question is whether Rynhart had or retained a 
legitimate privacy interest in the van, and, through 
the van, in its contents. See Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306-07, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 
1303-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (acknowledging 
that containers in a vehicle are to be treated as a 
part of the vehicle for purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis). 
% 24 Instead, our analysis should follow either 
United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85 (5th Cir. 1994), 
or United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th 
Cir.1986), in addressing this issue. [FN4] In 
Barlow, following a robbery, *823 a police officer 
followed the robber's escape path. See Barlow, 17 
F.3d at 87. Along this path, the officer discovered 
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"a car parked at the end of a street, away from any 
businesses and pointed toward the freeway." Id. The 
officer approached the car and found that it was 
unlocked, that the engine was warm, and that a key 
was in the ignition. See id. The officer then 
reported the car's license plate number and was 
informed that the listed owner claimed "no longer to 
own the car." Id. The officer then looked in the car 
in an attempt to identify the current owner. See id. 
He opened the glove compartment and found a 
wallet, Barlow's identification, and some .38 caliber 
bullets. See id. Soon thereafter, the officer caught 
up to Barlow, arrested him, and, during a search 
incident to the arrest, discovered a loaded .38 
caliber pistol. See id. Barlow moved to suppress 
the evidence discovered during the officer's search 
of the car, which the trial court denied. See id. 
FN4. The Bissegger court, in addressing the 
State's abandonment argument, relied upon State v. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev'd, 
850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) (reversing our 
conclusion that the warrant was invalid, thus, the 
supreme court had no reason to address the 
abandonment issue). See State v. Bissegger, 2003 
UT App 256,1fll 13-15, 76 P.3d 178. However, 
while the Bissegger court noted that Rowe had-been 
reversed, it failed to acknowledge that the Rowe 
decision is at best a plurality. See Rowe, 806 P.2d 
at 739 (Garff, J., concurring); 806 P.2d at 740 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Thus, the precedential 
value of Rowe is limited. Moreover, I believe that 
our particular abandonment standard, based on the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, is fatally flawed. Through this 
standard, we have placed the burden on the state to 
show by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence, 
that the defendant actually intended to abandon his 
or her legitimate right to privacy. See Bissegger, 
2003 UT App 256 at t 14, 76 P.3d 178. There are 
two problems with this standard. 
First, the expectation that the state must, 
essentially, prove abandonment by clear and 
convincing evidence, see Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736 
(stating that "[t]he burden of proving abandonment 
falls on the state, and must be shown by 'clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence' " (citation 
omitted)), does not comport with the expectations 
of most other courts. See United States v. Pitts, 
322 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir.2003) ("To 
demonstrate abandonment, the government must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant's ... actions would lead a reasonable 
person in the searching officer's position to believe 
that the defendant relinquished his property 
interests in the item to be searched."), cert, denied, 
— U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 128, 157 L.Ed.2d 90 
(2003); United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 
836 (7th Cir.2000) ("To demonstrate 
abandonment, the government must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's 
voluntary words or conduct would lead a 
reasonable person in the searching officer's 
position to believe that the defendant relinquished 
his property interests in the item searched or 
seized."). 
Moreover, the "clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence" standard adopted in Rowe is actually the 
standard of evidence applied in civil cases dealing 
with the abandonment of a property right, not the 
abandonment of a legitimate expectation of 
privacy, see Friedman v. United States, 341 F.2d 
697, 704-06 (8th Cir.1965) (addressing the 
question of whether the defendants in the case had 
abandoned their property rights to certain premises 
or its contents), and it seems to have been unwisely 
imported into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Accord State v. Finney, No. 21180, 2003 WL 
245727, *5, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 518, *14 
(Ohio Ct.App. February 5, 2003) (" 'The issue is 
not abandonment in the strict property-right sense, 
but whether the person prejudiced by the search 
had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise 
relinquished his interest in the property in question 
so that he could no longer retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time 
of the search.' " (citation omitted)); State v. 
Villegas, No. 21100-2-IH, 116 Wash.App. 1014, 
2003 WL 1091032, *2 2003 Wash.App. LEXIS 
416, *6 (Wash.Ct.App. March 13, 2003) (stating 
"the crux of our analysis is not [the defendant's] 
interest [in the container] as applied under property 
law, but his reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the [container] under a potential illegal search 
analysis."), amended by No. 21100-2-III, 2003 
Wash.App. LEXIS 1097 (June 3, 2003); see 
Linscomb v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 199 
F.2d 431, 433 (8th Cir.1952) (abandonment as an 
affirmative defense in replevin action); Williams v. 
Barnette, No. CA98-1261, 1999 WL 360291, 
**l-5 1999 Ark.App. LEXIS 409, **l-4 
(Ark.Ct.App. June 2, 1999) (abandonment and 
easements); Stone v. Geyser Quicksilver Mining 
Co., 52 Cal. 315, 317- 18 (1877) (abandonment 
and mining rights); Mineral Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. 
Chandler, NO.2002-CA-001178-MR, 2003 WL 
21246036, **l-3 2003 Ky.App. LEXIS 135, **l-3 
(Ky.Ct.App. May 30, 2003) (abandonment and 
natural gas leases); Phillips v. Gregg, 628 A.2d 
151, 152-53 (Me. 1993) (abandonment and 
easements); Doherty v. Russell, 116 Me. 269, 101 
A. 305, 306-07 (1917) (abandonment and life 
estates); Stieffv. Collins, 237 Md. 601, 207 A.2d 
489, 490-91 (1965) (abandonment of 
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nonconforming use), 
Clausi v Meddaugh, 116 A D 2d 850, 498 
N Y S 2d 267, 268 (N Y App Div 1986) 
(abandonment and easements), Consolidated Rail 
Corp v MASP Equip Corp , 67 N Y 2d 35, 499 
N Y S 2d 647, 490 N E 2d 514 1986 N Y LEXIS 
16334, **4-6 (NY February 11, 1986) 
(abandonment and easements), New Yoik 
Connecting R Co v Queens Used Auto Parts, 
Inc, 72 N Y S 2d 546, 549-50 (N Y Sup 1947) 
(abandonment and easements), modified, 273 A D 
908, 77 N Y S 2d 505 (N Y App Div 1948), 
Moore v DeVault, No M2001-02225-COA-
R3-CV, 2002 WL 31769110, **l-3 2002 
TennApp LEXIS 864, **8-10 (Term Ct App 
December 11, 2002) (abandonment and 
easements), Second Chance Farms, Inc v Perry 
County, No M200-00513- COA-R3-CV, 2001 
WL 219642, **5-6 2001 TennApp LEXIS 145, 
**11-15 (TennCtApp March 7, 2001) 
(abandonment and public roads), Lipscomb v 
Commins, 212 Va 543, 186 S E 2d 74, 74-75 
(1972) (per curiam) (abandonment and rights of 
way), see also Simms v District of Columbia, 612 
A 2d 215, 218-19 (D C 1992) (abandonment of 
property as an affirmative defense), Williams v 
United States, 337 A 2d 772, 774 (D C 1975) 
(same) 
Second, our requirement that the state prove the 
defendant's intent, m other words the adoption of a 
subjective standard of proof, also fails to comport 
with most other courts' analyses of this issue See, 
e g , United States v Lonedog, 67 Fed Appx 543, 
2003 WL 21357264 2003 U S App LEXIS 11687 
(10th Cir 2003) ('The abandonment determination 
is made by objective standards However, an 
expectation of privacy is a question of intent which 
may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, 
and other objective facts "), Pitts, 322 F 3d at 
456, ("[Abandonment] is an objective test[ ]"), 
Basinski, 226 F 3d at 836 ("Because this is an 
objective test, it does not matter whether the 
defendant harbors a desire to later reclaim an item, 
we look solely to the external manifestations of his 
intent as judged by a reasonable person possessing 
the same knowledge available to the government 
agents "), United States v Yiu Pong Liu, 180 
F 3d 957, 960 (8th Cir 1999) (" '[W]hether an 
abandonment has occurred is determined on the 
basis of objective facts available to the 
investigating officers, not on the basis of the 
owner's subjective intent' " (citation omitted)), 
United States v Jones, 707 F 2d 1169, 1172 (10th 
Cir 1983) ('The test for abandonment is whether 
an individual has retained any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the object This 
determination is to be made by objective 
standards " (citation omitted)), United States v 
Gutierrez-Medina, 41 F Supp 2d 1191, 1195 
(E D Wash 1998) (The test [for abandonment of a 
legitimate expectation of privacy] is an objective 
one and intent may be inferred from words spoken, 
acts done and other objective acts " (emphasis 
added)), State v Dixon, 2001 WL 209907, *4 
2001 Del Super LEXIS 66, *15 (Del Super Ct 
February 15, 2001) ("When determining whether 
property has been abandoned in the context of 
search and seizure analysis, the Court must 
administer an objective test "), State v K W, 832 
So 2d 803, 805 (Fla Ct App 2002) (per curiam) 
(Nesbitt, J , concurring) ("The test to be applied m 
determining whether a person has abandoned 
property is an objective one[]"), State v 
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 981 P 2d 1160, 1162 
(Idaho Ct App 1999) ("Abandonment, in the 
Fourth Amendment context, occurs through words, 
acts, or other objective facts indicating that the 
defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or 
otherwise relinquished his interest in property "), 
State v Villegas, 116 Wash App 1014, 2003 WL 
1091032, *2 2003 Wash App LEXIS 416, *6 
(Wash Ct App March 13, 2003) ("Abandonment 
is an ultimate fact or conclusion based generally 
upon a combination of act and intent [I]ntent 
may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, 
and other objective facts with all relevant 
circumstances surrounding the alleged 
abandonment considered " (second alteration m 
original) (quotations and citations omitted)) 
Finally, I believe the holding of Rowe conflicts~if 
not m fact, at least m spint~with California v 
Hodari, 499 U S 621, 111 S Ct 1547, 113 
L Ed 2d 690 (1991), which was decided after we 
issued Rowe In Hodari, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the defendant had an 
expectation of privacy m evidence picked-up by the 
police after the defendant had tossed it away See 
id at 623-24, 111 S Ct at 1549 Although the 
opinion focused on whether the defendant had been 
unlawfully seized prior to discarding the evidence, 
the Court, relying on Hester v United States, 265 
U S 57, 58, 44 S Ct 445, 446, 68 L Ed 898 
(1924), concluded that the evidence had been 
abandoned by the defendant, even though he was 
being pursued by the police See Hodan, 499 
U S at 629, 111 S Ct at 1552 
In Rowe, during a search incident to a warrant, 
police officers informed the defendant that she was 
free to leave and escorted her to a bedroom to 
retrieve her belongings See State v Rowe, 806 
P2d 730, 736 (Utah Ct App 1991), rev'd, 850 
P 2d 427 (Utah 1992) After she retrieved her 
shoes, she affirmatively claimed that she owned 
nothing else m the room See id (' Defendant was 
allowed to leave the party She was conducted to 
the bedroom to retrieve her shoes and was given 
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the opportunity to claim any other property that 
belonged to her. When asked ... she stated that 
she had retrieved everything in the bedroom that 
was hers."). Later, police officers discovered 
defendant's purse, in which they found 
methamphetamine as well as defendant's 
identification. See id. at 732. Defendant was 
subsequently arrested, and eventually filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence. See id. On 
appeal, this court, after first determining that the 
warrant was flawed (a determination later reversed 
by the Utah Supreme Court), decided that the 
defendant had not abandoned her expectation of 
privacy, but instead she had made "a mere 
disclaimer of interest to avoid self-incrimination." 
Id. at 736. However, in retrospect it appears that, 
much like the defendant in Hodari, the defendant 
in Rowe essentially tossed away her purse. Thus, 
she abandoned her privacy interest in the purse. 
Consequently, it appears that the United States 
Supreme Court, sub silencio, reversed Rowe's 
abandonment analysis and conclusion. 
Accordingly, I believe our abandonment standard 
to be incorrect and it is our duty to amend it to 
comport with • Federal Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence on this issue. Of course, it is 
possible that the Rowe standard comports with the 
protections afforded under the Utah Constitution. 
However, that question is not today before this 
court and is best left to another time. 
T[ 25 On appeal, Barlow renewed his suppression 
argument. See id. The court, in analyzing his 
claim, set forth the following standard to apply 
when analyzing abandonment claims: 
Under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 
88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), no 
warrantless search is lawful if the accused 
manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the object searched. One cannot, however, 
manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an 
item once it has been abandoned. The test for 
determining when an object has been abandoned is 
one of intent, which "may be inferred from words 
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." The 
accused need not have abandoned the searched 
item in the strict property sense, when an intent to 
relinquish ownership must be shown; merely an 
intent voluntarily to relinquish his privacy interest 
is sufficient. A defendant has abandoned his 
reasonable expectation of privacy when he leaves 
an item in a public place. 
Barlow, 17 F.3d at 88 (citations omitted). In 
applying this standard, the court determined that "it 
was reasonable [for the officer] to assume that the 
car had been abandoned, and the officer was 
justified in searching the car to identify its owner." 
Id. In so concluding, the court stated that "[t]he only 
relevant *824 facts in determining the 
reasonableness of Barlow's privacy expectation are 
the location of the vehicle, its condition, the time 
..., and other factors that might have indicated an 
intent to relinquish ownership." Id. at 89. [FN5] 
FN5. The court also found that "[t]he only fact 
weighing against the conclusion that the vehicle 
had been abandoned was that it was still warm." 
United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 89 (5th 
Cir.1994). However, even taking the warm hood 
into account, the court concluded that "a police 
officer who discovers an unlocked car at the end of 
a public street with the key in the ignition could 
reasonably conclude that the car had been 
abandoned." Id. Thus, the court determined that 
under the circumstances, signs of recent use were 
not sufficient to revive a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
U 26 In Oswald, the defendant's car "burst into 
flames" while he was driving through rural 
Tennessee. Oswald, 783 F.2d at 664. The 
defendant pulled the car to the roadside and leapt 
from the car, leaving the key in the ignition and a 
briefcase full of cocaine in the trunk. See id. A 
passing motorist stopped and offered to help, 
however, the defendant instead asked the driver to 
take him to a telephone. See id. The defendant then 
left the scene in the car of the passing motorist, an 
act that was witnessed by a number of others in the 
area. See id. Soon thereafter, local fire and police 
officials responded to the burning car, and, after the 
flames were extinguished, the police officer 
searched the car, finding, among other things, the 
case containing the cocaine. See id. at 664-65. 
TI 27 The officer transferred the items he had found 
to his patrol car's trunk, took the key (and the 
steering column to which the key was fused after the 
fire) and continued prosecuting his duties. See id. at 
665. Approximately two hours later, knowing full 
well that the car's owner or driver had neither 
reported the fire, nor returned to the scene, the 
officer began to search the items collected from the 
car. See id. Among the belongings, the officer first 
discovered the defendant's identification, and then 
the officer pried the briefcase open, discovering a 
large quantity of cocaine. See id. Some time later, 
the defendant was arrested and charged with 
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possession with intent to distribute, whereupon he 
moved to suppress the evidence pulled from his car 
See id The trial court demed the motion, and the 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea See id 
U 28 On appeal, the defendant renewed his 
argument See id The court, in examining the 
issue, stated, "[w]hether property has been 
'abandoned,' in this sense does not depend on where 
legal title rests, or whether one asserting a Fourth 
Amendment right has a legally enforceable 
possessory interest in the property, the question, 
rather, is whether the person claiming the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment 'has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy m the mvaded place ' " Id 
at 666 (quotmg Rakas v Illinois, 439 U S 128, 
143, 99 S Ct 421, 430, 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978)) 
The court farther stated that "[n]ot only will privacy 
expectations vary with the type of property 
involved, but they will vary with the location of the 
property " Id at 666-67 (citation omitted), see 
Hester v United States, 265 U S 57, 59, 44 S Ct 
445, 446, 68 L Ed 898 (1924) (establishing the 
"open fields" doctrine, wherein Fourth Amendment 
protections are diminished m open fields) Thus, 
"[o]ne who [chooses] to leave luggage in an 
unlocked burned-out automobile at the side of a 
highway in the country can fairly be thought to have 
a much lower expectation of privacy " Oswald, 783 
F 2d at 666 Moreover, the fact that "the person 
happens to be guilty of a crime" does not change the 
fact that it is reasonable to conclude that a person is 
considered to have abandoned any reasonable 
expectation of privacy when they fail to come 
forward within a short, but reasonable time to claim 
their property Id, see United States v 
Ramapuram, 632 F 2d 1149, 1155 (4th Cir 1980) 
("It is sufficient here to observe that whatever 
expectation of privacy attends a closed but 
unsecured 'effect' generally is diminished where the 
'effect' itself is placed in an area totally without the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment such as m an 
open field ") 
U 29 In conjunction with Barlow and Oswald, I also 
believe Ramapuram to be instructive, not, however, 
on the issue of abandonment, but instead regarding 
the existence of a reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy In Ramapuram, the 
defendant was accused of stealmg 100 sticks of 
dynamite, *825 which federal agents subsequently 
discovered during a warrantless search See 
Ramapuram, 632 F 2d at 1151 The defendant had 
secreted the dynamite in "the trunk of a Chevrolet 
automobile which was parked in a field on a farm 
located in Baltimore County, Maryland, and owned 
by [the defendant's] father " Id The court 
described the car as a 'junker," but noted that it was 
titled in the name of the defendant's father, for the 
benefit of his son, thus, the court treated the 
defendant as the owner of the car Id at 1152, 1156 
n 12 The car itself was without "current state 
licence tags, the trunk lock assembly had been 
removed and the doors were unlocked " Id at 1152 
After examining these circumstances, the court 
determined that the defendant "had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy" m the car, the contents of its 
trunk, or its passenger compartment See id at 
1153 The court based this conclusion, m part, on 
the fact that ' the thrust of the Fourth Amendment 
simply does not extend to locations lackmg a 
foundation for reasonably expectmg that the 
materials will be accorded privacy " Id The court 
further stated that " '[w]hat is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is by definition related to 
time, place and circumstance ' " Id at 1154 
(citation omitted) The court then invoked the 
United States Supreme Court's test for determining 
whether a legitimate expectation of privacy "has 
been invaded by government action " Id at 1154 
(quotations and citation omitted) 
" 'This inquiry, as Mr Justice Harlan aptly noted 
m his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two 
discrete questions The first is whether the 
individual, by his conduct, has "exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," 
whether, m the words of the Katz majority, the 
individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve 
[something] as private " The second question is 
whether the individual's subjective expectation of 
privacy is "one that society is prepared to 
recognize as 'reasonable,' " whether, in the words 
of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation, 
viewed objectively, is 'justifiable" under the 
circumstances ' " 
Id (citations omitted) 
K 30 The court then determined that because, (1) the 
car had been left in an open field, and (2) under the 
logic supporting the " 'automobile exception,' " and 
based on ' the actual characteristics of the container" 
involved, the defendant had no legitimate or 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car or its 
interior Id at 1155-56 Finally, the court 
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examined the impact of the defendant's ownership 
status on his expectations, and concluded that 
ownership, in and of itself, was insufficient to 
change the outcome. See id. Instead, the court 
focused on the defendant's failure to secure the 
vehicle, either its doors or its trunk, and the fact the 
defendant did not live on the property where the car 
was sitting. See id. Thus, the court concluded that 
the trial court had not erred in denying defendant's 
motion to suppress. See id.; see also State v. 
Rubert, 2001 WL 1285939, *3, 2001 
Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 853, **8, 9 (stating 
"[w]hen an individual flees from a vehicle, he or she 
is deemed to have abandoned the vehicle, thereby 
losing an expectation of privacy in that vehicle"). 
U 31 I believe these cases are much more salient to 
the instant case. Moreover, rather than assuming 
that Rynhart had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of her purse merely because it was a 
purse, I believe we must examine the totality of the 
circumstances to • determine whether, under these 
circumstance, any such expectation would have been 
legitimate. We will only conclude that the 
expectation was legitimate "if the individual 
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy and [the person's] actual expectation is one 
that society recognizes as reasonable." People v. 
Taylor, 253 Mich.App. 399, 655 N.W.2d 291, 
296-97 (2002). "To determine whether [Rynhart] 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in [either 
her purse or her van] sufficient to challenge the 
search under the Fourth Amendment, we must 
inquire whether [Rynhart] 'took the normal 
precautions to maintain her privacy—that is, 
precautions normally taken by those seeking 
privacy.' " Id. (citations omitted); see also Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152- 55, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 
L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating 
"the Court has examined whether a *826 person 
invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
took normal precautions to maintain his privacy" 
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11, 
97 S.Ct. 2476, 2483, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977))). 
K 32 In this case, following an accident resulting in 
her van coming to rest on the property of another, 
Rynhart chose to leave the van where it sat. She left 
it unlocked, illegally parked, and in an uncovered, 
open field. The analysis is thus guided by the 
objective fact that any expectation of privacy 
Rynhart may have had in the vehicle is reduced, as a 
matter of law, because the object in question is an 
automobile. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 
(1999) (noting that drivers and passengers "possess 
a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to 
property that they transport in cars, which 'trave[l] 
public thoroughfares.' " (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted)); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565, 569-71, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1985-86, 114 L.Ed.2d 
619 (1991) (discussing the nature of the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment). [FN6] Second, Rynhart left the van 
in an open field, which, as earlier noted, is not 
subject to the protections afforded hearth and home 
under the Fourth Amendment. See Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 
L.Ed. 898 (1924); see also Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 
L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (affirming Hester and its 
principle that no legitimate expectation of privacy 
arises in open fields). Thus, Rynhart left her 
vehicle-which traditionally enjoys reduced Fourth 
Amendment protections~in a field, which enjoys 
none. She left the vehicle, and its contents, illegally 
parked and unsecured for several hours following 
her accident. 
FN6. In citing the automobile exception, I in no 
way mean to assert that the search was justifiable 
under this exception. Rather, I point to the 
automobile exception to highlight one of the factors 
that suggest Rynhart abandoned any legitimate 
expectation of privacy she may have had under 
these circumstances. 
H 33 In behaving in this fashion, Rynhart, much 
like the defendant in Ramapuram, " 'exhibited [no] 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' " in that, 
through her actions, she made no effort to "seek to 
preserve [something] as private." Ramapuram, 632 
F.2d at 1154 (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted); see Pierre v. State, 732 So.2d 376, 379 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) (" 'Sometimes an 
automobile takes on the characteristics of a man's 
castle. Other times an automobile takes on the 
characteristics of an overcoat-that is, it is moveable 
and can be discarded by the possessor at will.' ") 
(quoting Thorn v. State, 248 Ark. 180, 450 S.W.2d 
550 (1970)); [FN7] see also State v. Bradford, 25 
Ariz.App. 518, 544 P.2d 1119, 1120 (1976) 
(concluding that the defendant abandoned his vehicle 
when he "fled after attempting to elude a pursuing 
police car and crashed into a shed on private 
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property"); Walker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 509, 493 
S.E.2d 193, 194- 95 (1997) (concluding that the 
defendant voluntarily abandoned his vehicle when he 
left it parked on the roadside in anticipation of an 
encounter with *827 the police); Hunt v. 
Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 692, 693-94 
(Ky.Ct.App.1972) (concluding that the defendant 
abandoned his vehicle after he ran from the police 
and left his vehicle in a public park for four hours 
without making any effort to retrieve it); cf. People 
v. Hall, 5 Cal.App.3d 116, 122, 85 Cal.Rptr. 188, 
191-92 (Cal.Ct.App.1970); State v. Rubert, 2001 
WL 1285939, *3* 2001 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 
853, **8, 9 (Tenn.Crim.App. October 25, 2001) 
("When an individual flees from a vehicle, he or she 
is deemed to have abandoned the vehicle, thereby 
losing an expectation of privacy in that vehicle."). 
FN7. The instant case is not dissimilar to State v. 
Wynn, 623 So.2d 848 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993). In 
Wynn, police officers were investigating a possible 
drug transaction when they noticed two illegally 
parked vehicles, one of which was the defendant's 
truck. See id. at 848. The officers also noticed 
known, drug dealers standing near the vehicles 
talking 'with the occupants. See id. After ttie 
officers approached, and the drug dealers fled, the 
defendant "got out of the truck and departed 
without saying anything to the officers." Id. He 
"left his truck unlocked and illegally parked.... 
After forty-five minutes, during which time no one 
returned to the truck, the officer entered the truck 
to search for identification or registration." Id. at 
848-49. "During this search, the officer saw a 
balled-up brown paper bag on the floorboard, 
opened it, and discovered a large quantity of 
cocaine in individual plastic bags." Id. at 849. On 
appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, the Florida Court of Appeals determined 
that the defendant had abandoned any expectation 
of privacy he may have had in the vehicle, thus the 
search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. at 849; see also Simmons v. State, 118 
S.W.3d 136 (Ark.App.2003) (concluding that the 
defendant abandoned his privacy interests in a 
container when he discarded it as he fled from the 
police); State v. Kauffman, 162 Or.App. 402, 986 
P.2d 696, 699 (1999) (concluding that the 
defendant abandoned his privacy interest when he 
ceded control of the involved container to a third 
party and "asked them to hide the bag in the bushes 
on property that did not belong to him"). 
|^ 34 Furthermore, from the available case law, it 
seems clear that whether or not Rynhart had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in her vehicle, 
when she left it as she did, she created a situation 
wherein society is not prepared to recognize her 
expectation as reasonable. See Ramapuram, 632 
F.2d at 1154 ("The second question is whether the 
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is 'one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 
"reasonable," ' whether, in the words of the Katz 
majority, the individual's expectation, viewed 
objectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances." 
(citations omitted)); see also United States v. 
Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 88-89 (5th Or. 1994) 
(discussing voluntary relinquishment of a person's 
legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle); 
accord United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 
666-67 (6th Cir.1986); People v. Hall, 5 
Cal.App.3d 116, 122, 85 Cal.Rptr. 188 
(Cal.Ct.App.1970); State v. Wynn, 623 So.2d 848, 
848-49 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993); Walker v. State, 
228 Ga.App. 509, 493 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1997); 
Hunt v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 692, 694 
(Ky.Ct.App.1972); State v. Rubert, No. 
M2000-00914-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1285939, *3, 
2001 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 853, **8-9 
(Tenn.Crim.App. October 25, 2001); cf. State v. 
Bradford, 25 Ariz.App. 518, 544 P.2d 1119, 1120 
(1976) (vehicle deemed to be abandoned following 
an accident from which the defendant fled); 
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, No. 1018-01-2, 2001 
WL 1117050, *3, 2001 Va.App. LEXIS 527, **7-8 
(Va.Ct.App. September 25, 2001). I can discern no 
significant difference between the instant case and 
the aforementioned cases. Thus, there is no 
principled reason to conclude that society is 
prepared to recognize Rynhart's subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
^ 35 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
Rynhart's actions did not demonstrate her wholesale 
failure "to preserve [something] as private," 
Ramapuram, 632 F.2d at 1154 (alteration in 
original), I would conclude Rynhart's action resulted 
in the reasonable conclusion that she abandoned her 
expectation of privacy, even under existing Utah 
law. [FN8] 
FN8. This court, in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 
736 (Utah Ct.App 1991), rev'd, 850 P 2d 427 
(Utah 1992), made the remarkable statement that 
abandonment is "primarily a factual question of 
intent." However, not only do I believe that the 
abandonment issue in Rowe was erroneously 
decided, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
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1269 (Utah 1993), I see nothing to support this 
court's decision to separate Fourth Amendment 
abandonment analysis from our normal Fourth 
Amendment analysis. Abandonment should be 
reviewed as "a mixed question of law and fact." 
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 665-66 
(6th. Cir.1986). Thus, as we do in all other search 
and seizure cases involving the review of a trial 
court's suppression decision, we should review the 
trial court's factual findings for clear error, and its 
conclusions of law for correctness. See State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) ("A 
finding not supported by substantial, competent 
evidence must be rejected."); id. at 689 
("Generally, whether the requisite voluntariness 
exists depends on 'the totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances.' " (citation omitted)); 
State v. Navanick, 1999 UT App 265,T[ 7, 987 
P.2d 1276 ("The trial court's legal conclusions 
[made regarding a motion to suppress], however, 
we review for correctness."). Admittedly, 
"[v]oluntariness is primarily a factual question," 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262, however, the trial 
court's ultimate conclusion concerning 
voluntariness is reviewed for correctness. See id. at 
1271. 
Similarly, I believe that when the central issue is 
whether or not the defendant has abandoned his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a container, 
vehicle,' or other object, "the trial court's 
underlying factual findings [should] not be set 
aside unless they are clearly erroneous," but the 
court's ultimate legal conclusion concerning 
abandonment should be granted no deference and 
should be reviewed for correctness. Id.; see also 
State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1997) ("We review for correctness the trial 
court's legal conclusions on motions to suppress. 
We will overturn the trial court's underlying 
factual findings only if those findings are clearly 
erroneous." (citation omitted)). 
In the instant case, the trial court made very few 
factual findings concerning this issue, and very few 
of the facts were subject to any dispute. The court 
found that a property owner called the Box Elder 
Sheriff's Department to report a van had been left 
on his property. The owner further reported that 
the van had crashed through two fences and come 
to rest in a marsh. The record supports this 
finding. The court further found that the vehicle 
had been in the marsh for over five hours, and the 
record also supports this finding. The final two 
findings relevant to this issue were (1) that the 
State failed to introduce evidence "of the state of 
the vehicle," and (2) that the vehicle's owner did 
not have sufficient time to make arrangements to 
retrieve the vehicle. Nothing in the record 
supports the second finding. Thus, in the absence 
of "substantial, competent evidence," this finding 
must be reversed. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
Moreover, given the other facts available to the 
trial court, I am uncertain of the materiality of the 
vehicle's condition. Furthermore, the undisputed 
facts, left undiscussed by the trial court include: 
(1) Rynhart left the van and its contents unsecured, 
(2) Rynhart did not report the accident or the 
location of the vehicle to the authorities, (3) 
Rynhart did not inform the property owner of the 
accident or tell him that she was leaving the van on 
his property, and (4) Rynhart left the scene of the 
accident, was not hospitalized, and was able to find 
her way to the impound lot later in the day to 
collect the vehicle. There was also no evidence, 
and Rynhart does not argue, that her decision to 
leave was in any way influenced by the police, 
removing any possibility that her flight was 
coerced. See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 309 
F.3d 736, 738 (10th Cir.2002). Consequently, I 
would conclude that Rynhart's behavior was 
voluntary as a matter of law. 
I would also conclude, again after focusing on the 
totality of the circumstances, that Rynhart 
abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy 
that she may have otherwise had when she left the 
van as she did. Following the single car accident, 
during which Rynhart careened through two 
fences, the van came to rest in a field or marsh. 
Said field was not owned by Rynhart, nor was it 
intended (in that it is a marsh) as a parking area. 
Rynhart- left the van and neither reported the 
accident to the police, nor did she inform the 
property owner of the accident or her decision to 
leave the van. Furthermore, when she left, she did 
not secure the van or its contents, she left an open 
bottle of liquor in the van, easily seen by anyone 
passing by, and she left the van where it had come 
to rest for over five hours. Thus, Rynhart's failure 
"to seek to preserve [the materials in the van] as 
private," United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 
1149, 1154 (4th Cir.1980), doomed her motion to 
suppress. She either had no expectation of privacy 
that society was prepared to recognize, or she 
voluntarily abandoned whatever expectation she 
had, as a matter of law. 
*828 In Utah, "the abandonment determination 
[currently] involves two inquiries: (1) whether the 
individual relinquished a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the item; and (2) whether the 
relinquishment was voluntary." State v. Bissegger, 
2003 UT App 2 5 6 4 14, 76 P.3d 178. Moreover, 
again under our case law, " '[t]he burden of proving 
abandonment falls on the state, ... and must be 
shown by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence. * 
" Id. (quoting Slate v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
81 P.3d 814 
(Cite as: 81 P.3d 814, *828) 
(Utah Ct.App. 1991)). 
^ 36 Here, the van had been involved in a single car 
accident. After crashing through a fence, it came to 
rest in a marsh, owned by someone other than 
Rynhart. Following the accident, Rynhart, for 
reasons unclear from the record, got out of the van, 
leaving her purse, briefcase, and a half-consumed 
bottle of liquor, and left the scene. She left the van 
unlocked, its contents fully available to any curious 
passerby. She reported the accident to neither the 
police, nor the property owner. Over five hours 
later, the police were called to the accident by the 
property owner, yet Rynhart had made no effort to 
contact the authorities. Therefore, even if we were 
to assume that Rynhart maintained a legitimate 
privacy interest in the van immediately following the 
accident, the record clearly reflects that Rynhart 
relinquished her privacy interest in the van and its 
contents. See Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256 at ^ 14, 
76 P.3d 178; cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 41, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1629, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 
(1988) (stating "the police cannot reasonably be 
expected to avert th£ir eyes from evidence of 
criminal activity that could have been observed by 
any member of the public," and " 'what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection' " (citation and alteration 
omitted)). 
If 37 It is also clear from the record that the 
relinquishment was her own decision and not the 
product of official coercion or force. Cf. State v. 
Vancleave, 2001 UT App 228,U 12, 29 P.3d 680 
(equating voluntariness to being " 'free from official 
coercion' " in the context of waiver of counsel 
(citation omitted)), cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135; 
accord United States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 738 
(10th Cir.2002) ("In order to be effective, 
abandonment must be voluntary. It is considered 
involuntary if *829 it results from a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.... [P]roperty is considered to 
have been involuntarily abandoned if the defendant 
discards it as a consequence of illegal police 
conduct." (citations omitted)); Hypolite v. State, 
985 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Tex.App. 1998) ("In order for 
an abandonment to occur, the decision to abandon 
must not be the product of police misconduct."); 
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 2001 WL 1117050, *2, 
2001 Va.App. LEXIS 527, *7 (Va.Ct.App. 
September 25, 2001) ("[I]ntention is a prime factor 
in determining whether there has been an 
abandonment. And courts must determine intent ... 
from the objective facts at hand. Abandonment may 
be demonstrated, for example, when a suspect 
leaves an object unattended in a public place." 
(second alteration in original) (quotations and 
citations omitted)). 
^ 38 In this case, at the time Rynhart crashed 
through the fence, she was not, in any way, 
involved with the police, nor was the police 
department even aware of the accident until over 
five hours after it occurred. Thus, her decision was 
neither the product of police coercion or any other 
police misconduct, and was, accordingly, made 
voluntarily. As a result, Rynhart voluntarily 
relinquished any legitimate expectation of privacy in 
her vehicle in leaving it as she did following the 
accident. Consequently, the officer's search of the 
vehicle did not, in any way, violate Rynhart's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
K 39 For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the 
abandonment standard we have adopted in Utah is 
flawed and contrary to generally accepted Fourth 
Amendment abandonment analysis. At a minimum, 
we should abandon the subjective approach to the 
analysis in favor of an objective analysis of intent. 
However, whether analyzed under the generally 
accepted standard, or under our flawed approach, I 
believe that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of 
privacy in the van. Thus, the trial court's order 
should be affirmed. Accordingly, I dissent from the 
majority decision to suppress the evidence 
discovered during the search. 
81 P.3d 814, 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2003 UT 
App 410 
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
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Case No. 021100039 FS 
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant 
seeks to suppress evidence found in her purse when an officer searched it on finding it in her 
vehicle. On 6 January 2002 a property owner who happens to be the Box Elder County Sheriff 
called officer Bumham about a vehicle that had jumped the curb, crashed through two fences 
and came to rest off the road in a marsh. Upon investigating, Officer Burnham discovered that 
the vehicle had been there at least five or six hours and that the driver was not anywhere near 
the vehicle. Officer Burnham searched the vehicle and the purse in an effort to determine who 
the driver was. 
The Defendant frames the issue as whether the officer conducted a proper search 
be determined from the facts and circumstances). The burden of 
proving abandonment falls on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal. 
App. 3d 450, 259 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be shown by 
"clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.'1 Friedman v. United States, 
341 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Boswell, 
347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So. 2d 
377, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). It "is measured from the vantage 
point" of the defendant, [** 19] and not the police. Narain v. State, 79 
Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (1989). "It is only the 
[defendant's] state of mind that counts." Id. 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) rev'don other grounds State v. Rowe, 850 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). Applying the standards set forth in Rowe, the court must conclude that 
the State has failed to carry its burden to show abandonment. The officer inspected the vehicle 
at 8:30 in the morning and determined that it had been in the marsh since at least 3:00 a.m. that 
morning. The owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the 
vehicle if it was damaged. The State failed to present any evidence of the state of the vehicle. 
If the vehicle could be driven, then the officer may have been more justified in believing that 
it had been abandoned. Although there clearly had been an accident, it appears that no other 
vehicles were involved. The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle 
nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the 
vehicle. 
The court does find, however, that the community caretaker function of the officer 
was properly invoked here. The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night. 
The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the driver so that he or she 
could be found. The driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. The officer 
acted appropriately in attempting to determine who was the driver. Although the Defendant 
makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by using the license plate 
number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily the same person, and the officer had a duty 
to ascertain the facts in order to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was 
lost. As such, all three prongs of the Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 994 P.2d 
1283 (2000) test are satisfied. (1) The officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that 
an emergency existed - a vehicle involved in an accident in the early morning hours that had 
been left by its driver. (2) The officer testified that the search was for the purpose of 
ascertaining who was the driver so that the motivation was not primarily to arrest or seize 
evidence, and (3) it was reasonable to search the purse in connection with the emergency. 
The motion to suppress is denied. Counsel for the State shall prepare an order in 
conformance with this decision. 
Dated this 0 I day of h*. , 20OJL 
By the court 





§ 4 1 - 6 - 3 2 . Collision with unattended vehicle or other property—Duties of 
operator—Penalty 
(l)(a) The operator of a vehicle that collides with or is involved in an 
accident with any vehicle or other property that is unattended and that resiilts 
in damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and shall: 
(i) locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the owner of 
other property of the operator's name and address and the registration: 
number of the vehicle causing the damage; or 
(ii) attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or ofhei: 
property a written notice giving the operator's name and address and the* 
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage, 
(b) If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections 
41-6-31(2) and (3). 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Laws 1941, c. 52, § 22; Laws 1977, c. 269, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 138, § 26; Laws 1999,vc. 
44, § 3, eff.May3, 1999. 
Codifications C 1943, § 57-7-99. 
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